A decision procedure implemented over a computational trust mechanism aims to allow for decisions to be made regarding whether some entity or information should be trusted. As recognised in the literature, trust is contextual, and we describe how such a context often translates into a confidence level which should be used to modify an underlying trust value. Jøsang's Subjective Logic has long been used in the trust domain, and we show that its operators are insufficient to address this problem. We therefore provide a decision-making approach about trust which also considers the notion of confidence (based on context) through the introduction of a new operator. In particular, we introduce general requirements that must be respected when combining trustworthiness and confidence degree, and demonstrate the soundness of our new operator with respect to these properties.
Introduction
Trust forms the backbone of human societies, improving system robustness by restricting the actions of untrusted entities and the use of untrusted information. Trust has also been studied within multi-agent systems [19] , where a trust value is associated with different agents. This level of trust is utilised by others when selecting partners for interactions; distrusted agents will rarely be interacted with, reducing their influence over the system.
Trust mechanisms aim to compute a level of trust based on direct and second-hand interactions between agents. The latter, commonly referred to as reputation information, is obtained from other agents which have interacted with the agent whose trust is being computed. Aspects of such systems that have been examined include how to minimise the damage caused by collusion between agents [7] , the nature of reputation information [11] , and examining trust in specific contexts and agent interaction configurations [3] .
It has also been recognised that trust is often context dependent. For example, while you may trust a mechanic (in the context of fixing your car), you would not trust him to perform heart surgery on you (in the context of a medical problem). One common approach to dealing with context involves holding a separate trust rating for each possible context. However, computing trust in the presence of a new context then becomes difficult, if not impossible [5, 18, 19] . In this paper, we assume that some sort of metric can be used to determine a similarity measure between contexts, leading to some confidence measure. This confidence measures how much weight should be placed in a trust rating in the original context. We express both confidence and trust using a Subjective Logic opinions [9] , and then seek to compute a final trust value based on both the original trust value and the degree of confidence.
In the next section we provide a running example which further motivates our work. We also provide a brief overview of Subjective Logic (hereafter evaluated SL). Section 3 describes several core properties that any combination of trust and confidence must comply with, thus deriving some requirements that have to be satisfied when combining a SL opinion with another one representing the confidence on the former. Section 4 shows that existing subject logic operators do not meet these properties and then derives a new operator which we prove to be compliant with the properties. Then we discuss related and future work in Section 5, and draw conclusions in Section 6.
Background and Motivations
In this work we focus on trust relations where the truster "depends" (using the same terminology of [4] ) on a trustee. As a concrete example, we examine the case where a trustee is responsible for providing some information to a truster, as exemplified by the following scenario. Example 1. Let X be a military analyst who is collecting evidences in order to decide whether or not a specific area contains a certain type of weapon. In particular, he needs a datum m from sensor Y , which has a history of failures and this affects X's perceived trustworthiness on Y . Here, X is the truster, and Y the trustee.
In such a scenario, the degree of trustworthiness of Y is normally computed from historical data (cf. [13] ). We consider four extensions of the basic scenario, wherein additional contextual information provides different degrees of confidence that X should trust Y 's information. More precisely, X can have high, low, uncertain or intermediate confidence in Y 's information.
We begin with a scenario where X has high confidence in their trust computation, as they have no reason to doubt that their original (perceived) trustworthiness degree should not be the case.
Example 1 (Continued). High confidence. Suppose that X knows that Y was recently maintained, and therefore has no reason to believe that Y should not be trustworthy. At the same time, however, Y has had a history of (random) failures, meaning that X does not completely trust Y 's reports. In such a scenario, it seems reasonable that X should compute a degree of trustworthiness directly from historical interactions, as they have no reason for believing that this computed degree of trust does not hold in such a situation.
This scenario can be contrasted with a low confidence scenario, where additional knowledge allows X to identify a different context, affecting the perceived degree of trustworthiness of reports from Y . This is captured by the following scenario.
Example 1 (Continued). Low confidence. Suppose that X knows that Y 's failures usually occur after a sandstorm, and that the data of interest was obtained following such an event. This is a strong reason for believing that the data collected are incorrect, despite the degree of trustworthiness which has been derived from the past interactions with Y . In such a situation, confidence in the degree of trustworthiness of Y will be very low.
A third limiting case occurs when there are reasons to believe that the current context does affect the trust computation, but no information is available regarding how it is affected. This is exemplified by the following situation.
Example 1 (Continued). Uncertainty. Consider the case where Y is in an area under the control of the enemy. Since the enemy can act to deceive Y , X might adopt a prudent approach and decide not to consider the information provided by Y . This is not because X does not believe it, but rather because Y might (but is not necessarily) being deceived by the enemy. Here, there is complete uncertainty with regards to the degree of trustworthiness associated with Y 's reports.
Finally, we can also identify an intermediate case, where it is known that the current situation negatively affects the degree of trustworthiness, and where an estimate of this effect can be determined. This is illustrated in the following scenario.
Example 1 (Continued). Intermediate confidence. Suppose that Y is known to operate well under certain environmental conditions, and that X must decide how to act in a situation that violates these parameters 1 . In this case X knows that the data they receive is somewhat accurate (given knowledge of Y 's behaviour), and can therefore have some confidence in their level of trust of Y .
In the above scenarios, we utilised two terms with a clear intuitive meaning, namely trustworthiness and confidence. These have well-established definitions in literature, which usually refer to the notion of trust.
Definition 1 (From [4] ). Trust is a relation between:
• an agent X (truster) which is a cognitive agent;
• an addressee Y (trustee) which is an agent in the broader sense of this term;
• a casual process (act/performance) and its results, viz. an act α of Y possibly producing an outcome p desirable because it includes (or corresponds to) a goal of X;
• a goal of X;
• a context C or situation or environment where X takes into account Y and/or where Y is supposed to act.
Below, using the notation introduced in [4] , we abbreviate the trust relation as TRUST (X, Y, C, τ, g X ), meaning that X trusts (in the information provided by) Y in the context C for performing action α (executing task τ ) and realising the result p that includes or corresponds to her goal g X .
One of the factors that determines the existence and the degree of this trust relation is the level or degree of trustworthiness in Y that X is judged to have.
Definition 2 (Adapted from [4] ). Given an agent X (truster), an addressee Y (trustee), a task τ , a goal g X and a context C, the trustworthiness of Y is a property of Y in relation to a potential partner X, concerning a task τ for reaching a goal g X in a context C:
n for some n ∈ N, n > 0, then DT is the degree of trustworthiness of Y in relation to a potential partner X.
As noted in [4] , X T W Y is one of the bases of the TRUST (X, Y, C, τ, g X ) relation, but the latter cannot be reduced to the former. In [4] several ingredients of trust are considered, but in this paper we concentrate on only two of the components that contribute to the relation, namely trustworthiness and confidence. While the other elements must also be considered, we believe that addressing these two components goes a long way in the computation of trust. Therefore, in this paper we aim only to determine a degree of trust given some perceived degree of trustworthiness in an information source together with a degree of confidence in the context under which the information is provided.
Definition 3 (Adapted from [24] ). Given an agent X (truster), an addressee Y (trustee), a task τ , a goal g X , a context C, and the trustworthiness of Y X T W Y , the confidence of
Following [12] , we express both the degree of trustworthiness and the degree of confidence using Subjective Logic (SL). This formalism extends probability theory expressing uncertainty about the probability values themselves, which makes it useful for representing trust degrees. We now proceed to provide a brief overview of SL mainly based on [9] .
Like Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [6, 21] , SL operates on a frame of discernment, denoted by Θ. A frame of discernment contains the set of possible system states, only one of which represents the actual system state. These are referred to as atomic, or primitive, system states. The powerset of Θ, denoted by 2 Θ , consists of all possible unions of primitive states. A non-primitive state may contain other states within it. These are referred to as substates of the state.
Definition 4. Given a frame of discernment Θ, we can associate a belief mass assignment m Θ (x) with each substate x ∈ 2 Θ such that
For a substate x, m Θ (x) is its belief mass.
Belief mass is an unwieldy concept to work with. When we speak of belief in a certain state, we refer not only to the belief mass in the state, but also to the belief masses of the state's substates. Similarly, when we speak about disbelief, that is, the total belief that a state is not true, we need to take substates into account. Finally, SL also introduces the concept of uncertainty, that is, the amount of belief that might be in a superstate or a partially overlapping state. these concepts can be formalised as follows.
Definition 5. Given a frame of discernment Θ and a belief mass assignment m Θ on Θ, we define the belief function for a state x as
The disbelief function as
And the uncertainty function as
These functions have two important properties. First, they all range between zero and one. Second, they always sum to one, meaning that it is possible to deduce the value of one function given the other two.
Boolean logic operators have SL equivalents. It makes sense to use these equivalent operators in frames of discernment containing a state and (some form of) the state's negation. A focused frame of discernment is a binary frame of discernment containing a state and its complement.
Θ , the frame of discernment denoted byΘ x , which contains two atomic states, x and ¬x, where ¬x is the complement of x in Θ, is the focused frame of discernment with focus on x. LetΘ x be the focused frame of discernment with focus on x of Θ. Given a belief mass assignment m Θ and the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions for x (b(x), d(x) and u(x) respectively), the focused belief mass assignment, mΘ x onΘ x is defined as
The focused relative atomicity of x (which approximates the role of a prior probability distribution within probability theory, weighting the likelihood of some outcomes over others) is defined as
For convenience, the focused relative atomicity of x is often abbreviated AΘ x (x).
An opinion consists of the belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity as computed over a focused frame of discernment.
Definition 7. Given a focused frame of discernment Θ containing x and its complement ¬x, and assuming a belief mass assignment m Θ with belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity functions on x in Θ of b(x),d(x),u(x) and a(x), we define an opinion over x, written ω x as
For compactness, Jøsang also denotes the various functions as b x ,d x ,u x and a x in place, and we will follow his notation. Furthermore, given a fixed a x , an opinion ω can be denoted as a b x , d x , u x triple.
Given opinions about two propositions from different frames of discernment, it is possible to combine them in various ways using operators introduced, above all, in [9, 13, 14, 15, 16] . Reviewing these operators is beyond the scope of this paper, which instead is aimed at providing an approach for deciding whether or not to trust a source of information given a degree of trustworthiness and a degree of confidence.
Note that the combination requirements describe the same "prudent" behaviour which has been presented in Example 1, in particular in the "high confidence" scenario. Indeed even if X is highly confident in a specific context, this confidence cannot increment the trust degree over the base trustworthiness degree.
Following [16, 15] , we utilise SL to instantiate trustworthiness and confidence, and seek to compute their combination through SL operations 2 . In doing so, we must therefore consider the following inputs and requirements:
Since 1. and 2. above are inputs, we concentrate on the constraints expressed by 3., which require us to consider the problem of how to combine the degree of trustworthiness with the degree of confidence. Existing work, such as [16, 4, 24] , concentrate on computing T . The problem of deriving the degree of confidence from a specific context (input 2.) is beyond the scope of this work but will form part of our future work.
Combining Trustworthiness and Confidence
We begin by noting -as illustrated in Table 1 -that none of the operators provided by SL [9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 10] Therefore, it is necessary to define a new Subjective Logic operator which complies with our combination requirements. To derive such an operator, we proceed in three steps.
1. We identify a legal set of opinions that satisfies combination requirement (d).
This legal set has specific geometric properties, allowing us to project an opinion onto a bounded plane.
2. We must identify a specific projection method.
3. Finally the method chosen in step 2 is used to project the confidence opinion to the set of values determined at step 1.
In order to prove the soundness of our approach, we first need to discuss the geometry of Subjective Logic. 
The Geometry of Subjective Logic
. Given that, the angle ∠ U BD = arctan(
, triangle BDU is equilateral where each slide is √ 2 and thus each altitude is
Since each opinion is a point inside triangle BDU , it can be mapped to a point in Figure 2 . This representation is similar to the one used in [9] for representing opinions in SL, but here the belief and disbelief axes are swapped for reasons that will become clear below. 
scale. The belief axis is the line from B 0 (its origin) toward the B vertex, the disbelief axis is the line from D 0 toward the D vertex, and the uncertainty axis is the line from U 0 toward the U vertex In order to keep the discussion consistent with Jøsang's work [9] , in what follows we will scale triangle BDU by a factor 1 :
For convenience, we write the following.
1
as the unit vector of the axis of belief;
as the unit vector of the axis of disbelief;
as the unit vector of the axis of uncertainty.
More precisely however, 1
U is the unit vector of the projection of the unit vector of the axis of uncertainty on a plane which intersects the plane determined by the Cartesian product of the unit vector of the axis of belief and the unit vector of the axis of disbelief; the points 1, 0, 0 and 0, 1, 0 are in that intersection, and the angle formed by the two planes is arctan(
an observer on V ). Therefore, a point p
V U (a point on the axis of uncertainty distant p from V ) can be projected into the triangle BDU using a line parallel to the plane determined by the Cartesian product of the unit vector of the axis of belief and the unit vector of the axis of disbelief, and the result of the projection will be the point p
. The same line of reasoning line can be applied to the remaining two axes. Given the fact that the projection introduces a simple scale factor, we ignore it below in order to both simplify our discussion and maintain consistency with existing work. With the above in hand, given an opinion O, depicted in These geometric relations lie at the heart of the Cartesian transformation operator which is the subject of the next subsection.
The Cartesian Representation of Opinions
As shown in 4.1, an opinion in SL can be represented as a point in a planar figure  (Fig. 2) laying on a Cartesian plane. In this section we will introduce the Cartesian transformation operator which returns the Cartesian coordinate of an opinion.
First of all, let us define the axes of the Cartesian system we will adopt.
Definition 9. Given the SL plane region BDU , the associated Cartesian system is composed by two axes, named respectively x, y, where the unit vector of the x axis #» e x = 1 | # » BD| # » BD, the unit vector of the y axis #» e y = # » e u , and B is the origin. 
Let us focus on the first part of the proposition. Consider Figure 3 . Given O, we note that the for the point P , 
e. P is on the line # » BP ), and therefore ∠ BP O = π 2 . Then we must determine Q and R s.t.
There are some notable elements of Fig. 3 that we will repeatedly use below, and we therefore define them as follows:
• the angle α O determined by the x axis and the vector # » BO;
• the three angles (γ O , δ O , and O ) of the triangle ODU , namely the triangle determined by linking the point O with the vertex D and U through straight lines.
Definition 10. Given the SL plane region BDU
and y O u O , let us define and (via trivial trigonometric relations) compute the following.
•
otherwise ;
where
Finally, as an element of SL is bounded to have its three components between 0 and 1, we are also interested in determining the point M O such that the vector # » BM O has the maximum magnitude given (a) the direction α O of an opinion O, and (b) M O is a SL opinion. In other words, determining the magnitude of # » BM O will allow us to re-define the vector # » BO as a fraction of
Definition 11. Given the SL plane region BDU , and
and y O u O , and
the straight line passing for O and B, and the straight line passing for U and D, and thus define the following.
The Trustworthiness-Confidence Combination Operator
In this paper, we analyse a single method for projecting the confidence opinion C into the space of SL opinions in order to satisfy the requirement that b W ≤ b T . In particular, we rely only on straight lines, leading to the definition of a new vector # » T C = T, α C , | # » T C | given the points T and C. Figure 4 depicts this situation. In particular, α C is such that the following proportion holds: α C :
where τ C is the angle ∠ DT C , and | # » T C | is such that the following proportion holds:
α C represents the angle that the vector # » T C makes to the vector parallel to the x axis, and thus, from Definition 10, we can write # » T C = T, α C , | # » T C | . In other words, when α C = 0, then τ C = 0 and thus we are projecting C in the direction
It is important to note that due to our choice of using straight lines to project C, the Figure 4 : Projection of the confidence opinion and combination with the trustworthiness opinion available space for projecting C is reduced from the four-sided figure U DQP (in Fig.   4 ) to the triangle T DU .
Given the new vector # » T C = T, α C , | # » T C | , the result of the combination of the trustworthiness opinion T and the confidence opinion O is the opinion W determined as the vector sum # » BW = # » BT + # » T C in the Cartesian system x, y . This leads us to our core result.
Definition 12. Given a trustworthiness opinion T = b T , d T , u T and a confidence opinion C = b C , d C , u C , the combination of T and C is W = T • C, where:
In particular:
, and
We now show that the combination requirements specified earlier are satisfied by •.
Proof. Proving the thesis in the limit case is trivial. In the following we will assume, without loss of generality, that
From Def. 12 it is clear that Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows.
In turn, using the relation tan(α C ) = sin(α C ) cos(α C ) , this can be rewritten as
which entails the requirement that r C ≤
However, from definition 12, we know that r C ≤ 1, fulfilling this requirement.
Point 2. C = 1, 0, 0 implies that | # » BC| = 0 and thus r C = 0. Therefore, from Def. 12, u W = u T + sin(α C )r C | # » T M C | = u T and this results also implies that d W = d T . Since Point 1 shows that W is an opinion in SL, we conclude that W = T .
Point 3. C = 0, 1, 0 implies that r C = 1, and α C = 0 which, in turn, implies, from Definition 12, that α C = −β T . Also from Definition 12,
. Then, recalling Definition 10 and the trigonometric property that sin(arctan(v)) = v √ 1+v 2 , we obtain
Similarly,
Therefore, from Eq. 3 and Eq. 4, and from Point 1,
tan(δ T ) ). From Definition 10 and the trigonometric property that tan(arcsin(v)) =
From Definition 10 we can write:
From Equations 5 and 6, together with Point 1, it follows that W = 0, 0, 1 = C.
Quod est absurdum.
Related and Future Works
In this paper we describe an approach to computing a final level of trust given degrees of trustworthiness and confidence expressed as SL opinions. The main body of related work therefore relates to the calculation of degrees of confidence, as well as works detailing SL operators for opinion combination.
The first topic has received only limited attention in the literature. In particular, [1] describe -in very general terms -the importance of confidence in the process that leads to the definition of the degree of trust, but do not provide any quantitative approach for combining the different components of trust. More recently, [23, 8, 17] discussed TRAVOS, a trust model that is built upon probability theory and based on observations of past interaction between agents. Moreover TRAVOS calculates the confidence of its trust values given an acceptable level of error: if the confidence level of a trust value is below a predetermined minimum level, TRAVOS will seek witness information about the target agent's past performance. TRAVOS in turn was extended in [22] , but this fundamental mechanism remains unchanged. Critically, this notion of confidence is based on the number of previous interactions and level of reputational information obtained, rather than context as in the current work.
Interestingly, there are correlations between the level of confidence and the presence of obfuscated information. Investigations into the links between trust and such obfuscated data have only recently begun [2, 20] , and to our knowledge, no approaches have been described for deriving a trust degree for a source of information which is obfuscating data.
Our work suggests several avenues of future work. First, we intend to investigate the overlaps between confidence obtained from systems such as TRAVOS and contextual confidence as described here. We will study how a degree of confidence can be derived from the context, and the differences with TRAVOS' notion of confidence. We also seek to determine whether our newly defined operator is beneficial in the context of reputational information and transitive trust. In order to do so, we intend to perform both an empirical and theoretical comparison between our system and existing ones. It is important to stress once more however that confidence, as expressed in existing work, does not deal with different contexts as we do in the current work.
Another avenue of future work will investigate how different levels of confidence can be used to reveal the presence of obfuscated information, improving the decision making process in such situations.
With regards to other SL operators, both the deduction and the discounting operator proposed in the literature [15] bear some similarities to the operator proposed in this paper. The SL deduction operator considers three opinions, namely an opinion for an event p, an opinion for the derivation rule p → c, and an opinion for the derivation rule ¬p → c, and deduces an opinion on the event c by "projecting" the precedent opinion triangle in the subsequent sub-triangle (cf. [14] ). However, the deduction operator and the trustworthiness-confidence-combination operator we provide in this paper are not directly comparable, as Jøsang's deduction operates on three elements, while our operator is binary (this is also the reason why we did not consider deduction or abduction in Table 1 ).
The discount operator was designed to propagate trust degrees across a trust net-work. In particular, the situation in Example 1 where an agent X is deciding whether or not to trust a source of information Y can be rephrased as follows. An agent X should decide whether or not to trust another agent K which is a mediator between X and the source of information Y such that K has his own degree of trust of Y . However, this situation is different to the one we examine -a mediator acts either as a repeater, and in this case X will always trust K, or is a fully-fledged agent, in which case X's trust on K about messages derived from Y must consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires of K.
A deeper (and eventually empirical too) evaluation of the differences between Jøsang discount and deduction operators therefore forms another important strand of envisioned future work. In addition, we intend to analyse these and other SL operators and properties from a geometrical perspective.
Finally, we are currently working on providing different ways for projecting the confidence opinion into the set of SL opinions satisfying the fourth combination requirement. As Figure 4 depicts, this will lead (in general) to a four-sided figure, unlike the current work, where the projected opinion is always inside a triangle which is strictly contained within that four-side figure. To do so, we will consider non-linear projection methods in the future, as opposed to the simple linear projection method applied in the current work.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduced an approach for deriving a trust degree on a source of information given a degree of trustworthiness and a confidence degree, with the latter potentially being determined by the current interaction context. In particular, the trustworthiness degree can be derived from past interactions with the source of information, which leads to a SL opinion. By expressing confidence as a SL opinion, we are able to describe an approach for merging the two degrees, this being one of our main contributions. Critically, we have shown that none of the existing SL operators satisfy the requirements necessary to perform this merging. Since our proposed operator is based on geometrical properties, we also introduce a formal geometric method for analysing SL opinions. While the contributions of this paper are clearly important, this work opens up a rich direction for future work, which we have already begun actively pursuing.
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